We estimate the value of innovative assets of private, innovative firms. Since young, private firms are the primary drivers of mold-breaking innovation, we focus on such firms. We adopt a novel approach that uses the price paid in the market for acquisitions of young, private targets and combine it with unique data hand-collected from Google Patents. We minimize systematic biases by comparing across deals undertaken within the same year by the serial acquirer Cisco Systems, whose processes for acquisitions are quite fine-tuned. To alleviate concerns about external validity, we cross-check the estimates obtained using Cisco's acquisitions with those undertaken by Yahoo and Google. We find order-ofmagnitude higher estimates for the value of patents when compared to existing studies. Apart from the intellectual property rights provided by patents, the value of a portfolio of innovative assets increases with the expertise underlying the assets as measured using citations to patents. Finally, consistent with intangible assets having a value that is contextspecific, we find that the value of the target's innovative assets increases when these assets overlap more with the acquirer's assets and with the assets of the acquirer's competitors. Apart from contributing to the literature on valuing innovative assets, ours is the first study to value innovative assets in mergers and acquisitions. 
Introduction
In this paper, we estimate the value of innovative assets of private, innovative firms. We focus on young, private firms since they are the primary drivers of mold-breaking innovation in an economy. While relevant, such an approach poses significant challenges on two fronts. First, data to value private firms is not easily available. Second, given the several "unknown unknowns" that characterize an innovative venture, valuing an innovative asset entails problems stemming from agency costs and asymmetric information. As a result, econometric concerns due to the biases in valuation stemming from agency costs and asymmetric information are severe in the case of private, innovative firms. We address the challenges relating to data on the value of private firms by adopting a novel approach. Since the market for acquisition of young, innovative firms is quite active, we used the value paid for such firms to value their assets. We combine this approach with unique data on patents and citations that we have hand-collected from Google patents. We overcome the econometric challenges mentioned above by examining differences in the value paid for targets that were acquired in the same year by the same acquirer, Cisco Systems. Cisco's fine-tuned processes relating to acquisitions help us to alleviate concerns about various systematic biases. To alleviate concerns about external validity, we cross-check the estimates obtained using Cisco's acquisitions with those undertaken by Yahoo and Google.
Estimating the value of innovative assets is important for the following reasons. Zingales (2009), Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian (2010) , Hirshleifer, Low, and Teo (2012) , Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li (2013) , Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian (2013) , Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2013) , Seru (2013) , Sevilir and Tian (2013) and others). Estimating the value of innovative assets is important to guide corporate and national policies relating to innovation.
Existing studies valuing innovative assets relate the stock market value of firms to various measures of knowledge capital such as research and development (R&D) expenditures, R&D stock, patents and citations to these patents (see Hall et. al. (2000) for a survey). Given the long gestation periods involved in innovative projects, this approach exploits the forwardlooking estimates provided by the stock market. However, since stock market values are available only for publicly listed firms, this approach cannot be extended to the young, private firms that are the key drivers of mold-breaking innovation in an economy (see Akcigit and Kerr (2011) , Acs and Audretsch (1987 , 1988 , 1993 , Zucker et al. (1998) , Kortum and Lerner (2000) , Samila and Sorenson (2010) , and Darby and Zucker (2003) ). Moreover, even for publicly listed firms, recent studies raise doubts about the stock market's ability to correctly value the complexities involved in innovative projects (see Chan, Lakanishok and Sougiannis (2001) , Cohen, Deither and Malloy (2013) for example).
The market for acquisition of innovative targets provides an alternate avenue to arrive at a fair estimate of the value paid for innovative assets. This is an active market as large firms in the high technology industries have acquired young, private firms regularly over the last two decades (see Figure 1 for example). Valuations arrived at by acquirers present intrinsic advantages when compared to the valuations arrived at by stock market participants. The incentives for proper due-diligence are greater for acquirers when compared to a typical market participant due to the larger stakes they acquire (at least 50% in our study, and 100% in many cases) as well as due to the fact that they are acquiring control over the business rather than undertaking a purely financial investment. Moreover, while other market participants may get multiple opportunities to value a firm, the acquirer has just one chance to value a firm which makes it imperative that the valuation is done accurately. The venture capital (VC) market for funding of new ideas may seem to be another avenue. However, VCs typically invest in relatively unproven ideas some of which may translate into innovative ventures while many others fall by the wayside. Moreover, VCs acquire cash flow rights together with control rights such as the right to liquidation, board seats, etc. As a result, the control rights need to be disentangled from the cash flow rights to arrive at an estimate of the value of an innovative asset using the post-money valuation provided by a VC.
However, there are attendant costs entailed in using this approach as each of the following motivations for mergers and acquisitions (M&A hereafter) can introduce errors in valuing innovative assets of private, innovative targets: (i) synergies (see Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996 , Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001 , Harford, 2005 , and Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008 ;
(ii) agency costs (Roll, 1986 and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990) ; and (iii) market timing (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003 , Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004 , and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005 . First, a high-tech firm whose portfolio of innovative products is empty may desperately seek synergies generated by acquiring a young, innovative firm. Such desperation may translate into greater value paid for the target. Moreover, the presence of multiple bidders-each of whom is desperate-can lead to overpayment stemming from the winner's curse (McAfee & McMillan, 1987) . Second, managerial hubris and/or empire building activities may lead to overpayment. Third, over-valuation of the target or the acquirer during a boom can introduce errors into the estimates for the value paid for the acquisition. As well, asymmetric information problems, which stem from the target knowing more about the value of its innovation portfolio than the acquirer, can introduce errors in valuation.
Given these challenges, the large sample of acquisitions undertaken over two decades by serial acquirer Cisco Systems provides us a sample where such errors are minimized. First, Cisco follows well-tuned processes for the due diligence of the target (Paulson, 2001) . Therefore, Cisco is unlikely to systematically overestimate the value of targets across all its acquisitions.
Moreover, Cisco's finely crafted M&A procedures are likely to ensure that the target's asymmetric information does not systematically lead to overvaluation of targets.
3 Second, unlike a one-time acquirer, a serial acquirer is unlikely to undertake a transaction out of desperation. As a result, acquirer desperation is unlikely to lead to overestimation of synergies in our sample.
3 Paulson (2001) mentions: "Cisco has constantly refined its acquisition process… the company has been so successful with its acquisitions that the industry created a new term for Cisco's type of research and development (R&D): Acquisition and Development (A&D)… (Cisco is) the company that has become the gold standard of M&A practices, both strategically and operationally… Cisco has figured out a process for M&A that works… the best practices (in M&A) are those of Cisco. The acquisition process at Cisco is quite systemized with guidelines established for determining targets, opening of discussions at the companies, and performing due diligence. The established process has meant that acquisition has become more of a routine process for Cisco. Turning acquisition into a process enables a large number of Cisco personnel to acquire expertise in the acquisition methodology, which then makes it less personnel dependent and more repeatable. Cisco has taken out as much of the guesswork out of the acquisition process as possible, which increases its reliability and decreases its associated risks. Acquisition as an occasional or opportunistic process, which is the exception to the rule, does not apply to Cisco Systems. At Cisco, acquisition is simply one of the activities it pursues as intrinsic to its continued success. As such, it is fostered, cultivated, streamlined, and continually improved just as any critical business process would be for any top-notch company. In other words, at Cisco Systems, acquisition is simply another business decision and process."
Relatedly, because serial acquirers that destroy shareholder value become targets themselves (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990) and Cisco has been a successful serial acquirer, systematic overpayment is unlikely to be a concern in our sample. 4 Third, in one-off acquisitions, an acquirer is likely to pay more during a boom and less during a recession. However, Cisco's acquisitions have spanned booms and busts. Moreover, since Cisco has acquired multiple targets every year, we can compare among the deals within a year. Therefore, we can abstract out the market timing issues that affect the value paid.
Finally, the target companies that Cisco has acquired are quite diverse. There are companies that do not have any patents at the time of the acquisition (Pipelinks Inc.), companies that have filed at least one patent though none of them have been granted at the time of the acquisition (Andiamo Systems Inc.), companies that have at least one patent granted before acquisition (P-Cube Inc.), companies that have not received any citations to their patents before the acquisition (PostPath Inc.), and companies that possess a large number of patents that are cited heavily (Scientific Atlanta Inc.). By comparing across such a varied portfolio of targets, we are able to effectively assess the value paid for the target's innovative portfolio. Thus, our empirical strategy enables us to abstract from several econometric issues that may affect less carefully constructed samples.
We find that the value of innovative assets is related to the following factors. As our first result, we find that the value of a portfolio of innovative assets is associated with the intellectual property rights provided by the portfolio. Aghion and Tirole (1994) argue that an innovative firm will have a stronger incentive to exert innovation effort if the firm owns the property right to the innovation, which enables the firm to capture a greater proportion of the value from the innovation it generates. Consistent with this determinant, we find that: (i) every additional patent filed before the acquisition (but granted eventually) increases its value by $88 million while every additional patent granted fetches $158 million; (ii) a private, innovative firm that has filed at least one patent (that is granted eventually) realizes about $567 million more than one that has not filed a patent; (iii) a private, innovative firm that has been granted at least one patent obtains about $718 million more than one that has not been granted a patent. These estimates are ordersof-magnitude higher than the value of patents estimated for publicly listed manufacturing firms 4 The CEO, John Chambers, attributes caution and discipline in the acquisitions that Cisco makes: "… it takes courage to walk away from a deal. It really does. You can get quite caught up in winning the acquisition and lose sight of what will make it successful. That's why we take such a disciplined approach."
by Hall et al. (2005) . The large differences can be attributed to the following factors. First, while innovative assets are not critical to manufacturing firms, they represent the lifeblood for innovative firms. As a result, the value of a patent is likely to be lower for manufacturing firms.
Second, when compared to private, innovative firms, which are the primary drivers of moldbreaking innovation, the value of innovation in publicly listed firms is likely to be lower. Finally, we use the value paid by a serial acquirer as opposed to that attributed by the stock market. Cohen, Deither and Malloy (2013) find that the stock market ignores the implications of past successes when valuing future innovation. In contrast, targets are unlikely to ignore the value of past successes when putting a price on themselves. Thus, unlike in Hall (2005) , our estimates are likely to incorporate the expected value implied by past successes.
As our second result, we find that the value of a portfolio of innovative assets increases with the expertise associated with these assets. Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001) argue that the value of an intangible asset extends above and beyond the property rights to the asset. Even if property rights over an asset are not granted, "access" to an intangible asset enables the employees of a firm to specialize to the firm's intangible assets and thereby acquire expertise over the asset. This expertise possessed by the employees makes them valuable to the firm.
Therefore, the expertise/technology underlying a portfolio of innovative assets adds value to the portfolio. Since citations provide an estimate of the value of an innovation, they proxy the value of the expertise/technology underlying a patent. Consistent with the value of a portfolio of innovative assets increasing with the expertise associated with these assets, we find that a standard deviation increase in the citations received by the target before the acquisition increases the target's value by $482 million. To capture the complete set of growth opportunities generated by a portfolio of innovative assets, we estimate the lifetime citations that the target's patents are expected to receive using the total citations received till 2012. Consistent with the value of a portfolio of innovative assets incorporating all future growth opportunities, we find that a standard deviation increase in lifetime citations increases the value by $537 million.
The above results are not driven by size of the target. Using the number of employees as the proxy for the target's size, we control for the target's size and repeat all our tests. Our results remain qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged. Furthermore, we find a positive and statistically significant effect for the number of target employees before the acquisition on the value paid. The positive effect of employees is consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1998)'s prediction that more the number of employees in a firm, greater the human capital specialized to the firm's assets. However, since we are unable to separate the relative effect of firm size from that of the employees' collective human capital, we cannot conclusively attribute this effect to the human capital of the target's employees.
Finally, because intangible assets are more context-specific than physical assets, the value of a portfolio of innovative assets stems from its value to particular firms. Existing studies that have used the stock market value of innovative assets cannot estimate the specific value of a portfolio of innovative assets. However, our use of the value paid by acquirers of young, private innovative firms enables us to estimate the specific value of innovative assets by examining the value specific to the acquirer. For this purpose, we estimate the relevance of the target's innovative assets to those of the acquirer using the number of citations made by the acquirer to the target's patents. We expect that greater the number of citations made by the acquirer to the target's patents, greater the relevance of the target's innovative portfolio to the acquirer, and greater the value paid. Consistent with this argument, we find that each citation received from
Cisco before the acquisition is worth close to six times the average citation received before the acquisition. To more carefully measure the overlap between the target's expertise and the acquirer's expertise, we calculate the dot product by constructing a vector where we allocate the patents/citations of either firm to the various industry categories. Using these overlap measures, we find that a one percent increase in overlap between the target's expertise and that of the acquirer increases the value paid by $10 million. We also find that a one percent increase in overlap between the target's expertise and that of the acquirer's competitors increases the value paid by $7 million. These results suggest that a significant portion of the value of innovative assets resides in their use specific to a particular firm.
Since our sample includes the acquisitions of one serial acquirer-albeit a successful one with well-established due diligence practices-concerns about the external validity of our findings naturally arise. To alleviate these concerns, we examine the out-of-sample predictive power of the estimates obtained using Cisco's acquisitions to estimate the difference in the values among multiple acquisitions done in the same year by Google and Yahoo (note that given the year fixed effects that we employ in all our specifications, we can only predict such withinyear differences). Across the 56 acquisitions done by Google and Yahoo, we find that the median error of prediction ranges between 6.8% and 8.7 %. Apart from alleviating concerns of external validity, the median error being small also validates our empirical strategy.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the existing literature.
In section 3, we describe the empirical hypotheses. In section 4, we describe our data and the proxies we employ. We then test these hypotheses and report the results from the same in section 5. In section 6, we discuss the possible limitations of our study before concluding in section 7.
Review of the literature
Our study contributes primarily to the studies that attempt to value the innovative assets of firms. We adopt a novel approach that employs the value assessed in the active market for the acquisition of private, innovative firms to arrive at quantitative estimates of the value of innovative assets of private, innovative firms. Trajtenberg (1989) studied hospital purchase of CAT scanners to estimate the social value of innovation using the consumer's willingness to pay for particular innovations. Trajtenberg (1990) introduced the use of patent citations to estimate the value of innovative assets. Hall (1998) examines the value of knowledge assets of publicly listed manufacturing firms and finds that R&D spending/R&D stock, patents and citationweighted patents are valued by financial markets in computing the market value of firms. In particular, they find that patents are informative above and beyond R&D, and citation-weighted patents are slightly more informative than patents. Kogan et. al. (2012) combine stock price reactions to news about patent application/approval to measure the value of innovation and examine its growth effects. They argue that weighing each patent based on the firm's idiosyncratic stock return on the day the patent was applied or issued serves as a signal of the economic value of each patent. While Trajtenberg (1990) , Hall (1998) and Kogan et al. (2012) study the stock market valuation of publicly listed firms, we examine the value of innovation from a slightly different perspective. Our focus is on assessing the value of mold-breaking innovation because young, private firms possess a distinct comparative advantage in undertaking path-breaking innovation (Akcigit and Kerr, 2010 and others). Second, in contrast to these studies, we study the value paid by a serial acquirer. This is partly necessitated by our focus on private firms, for which we do not have the values assessed by the stock market. However, as argued in the introduction, studying the valuation by an acquirer, especially a serial acquirer reputed for its fine-tuned processes relating to M&A, reduces systematic biases. Compared to the existing studies, we find orders-of-magnitude higher estimates for the value of patents.
As the secondary contribution, to our knowledge, ours is the first study to examine the value paid for intangible assets-specifically innovative portfolios-in M&A. As argued in the introduction, over the last two decades, established firms have regularly acquired young, innovative firms to stay at the cutting edge of the innovation frontier. Therefore, in and itself, it is important to study the determinants of the value paid for the innovative assets of such firms.
Third, we contribute to the M&A literature examining acquisitions of private firms (Officer, 2007 , Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002 , Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004 , Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin, 2006 , Chang, 1998 , Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller 2009 ).
Several of these papers document positive returns to acquirers of private targets. We instead examine the determinants of the value paid for acquisition. In this respect, our study resembles
Officer (2007) who shows that premiums for private targets are significantly lower than those for similar public firms since the acquisition provides liquidity to the private target's owners. Our work differs from Officer (2007) because we examine the effect of knowledge-related intangible assets on the value paid for private firms. Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) show that small firms innovate more when they can be acquired by larger firms. In contrast, we use the market for acquisition of small firms to estimate the value of their innovative assets.
Fourth, by comparing deals undertaken in the same year by a serial acquirer, we make a methodological contribution to the M&A literature that examines the determinants of the value paid for acquisitions. While we employ the sample of acquisitions by a serial acquirer to precisely estimate the value corresponding to knowledge-related intangible assets, other studies investigate the post-acquisition performance of serial acquirers (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990 , Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002 , Billett and Qian, 2008 , Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll, 2011 , Offenberg, Straska, and Waller, 2012 . In a recent study, Offenberg, Straska, and Waller (2012) study the gains from takeovers of companies that previously engaged in a value-reducing acquisition program. Their central finding is that the takeover premium is higher when the value loss from the targets' prior acquisitions is larger. In contrast to Offenberg, Straska, and Waller (2012), we study how the value of an acquisition is affected by the target's innovative portfolio.
Finally, our study contributes to an emerging literature in accounting that relates to the changes in the norms for accounting of intangible assets in business combinations following 
Hypotheses
We use the prices paid by the serial acquirer Cisco Systems for private, innovative firms to estimate the private economic value of innovative assets. To observe the returns/profit generated by any innovative asset, we should obtain the price paid for such assets in an active market for such assets. The innovative assets that are necessary for producing innovative products usually come bundled in ways that prevent us from valuing them separately. Since acquirers pay for the portfolio of innovative assets possessed by the target, the market for acquisition of private, innovative firms provides us estimates from an active market where the portfolio of innovative assets possessed by the target is valued. For example, a patent for developing an antibody for an AIDS drug is much more valuable when combined with a patent for administering the drug intravenously to humans. To capture this portfolio aspect of the value of innovative assets, we adopt the hedonic pricing method pioneered by Rosen (1974) as applied to the valuation of innovative assets (see Hall (2000) for the survey). Using the theoretical underpinnings for the valuation of innovative assets, we develop the following hypotheses for the characteristics that would associate with the value of a portfolio of innovative assets.
Aghion and Tirole (1994) show that established firms in the high technology industries may find it efficient to source innovation from specialized targets rather than to innovate internally. They argue that an innovative firm will have a stronger incentive to exert innovation effort if the firm owns the property right to the innovation, which enables the firm to capture a greater proportion of the value from the innovation it generates. Therefore, we predict that:
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the value of a portfolio of innovative assets increases with the intellectual property rights the portfolio provides.
Building on the Property Rights Literature (Grossman and Hart, 1986 , Hart and Moore, 1990 , Hart, 1995 , Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001) argue that the value of an intangible asset extends above and beyond the property rights to the asset. In their setting, even if property rights over an asset are not granted, "access" to an intangible asset enables the employees of a firm to specialize to the firm's intangible assets and thereby acquire expertise over the asset. This expertise possessed by the employees makes them valuable to the firm. Therefore, the expertise/technology underlying a portfolio of innovative assets adds value to the portfolio.
Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the value of a portfolio of innovative assets increases with the expertise/technology associated with the portfolio.
Intangible assets have value in generic use as well as in specialized to another agent/firm.
Apart from enunciating the value provided by the property rights over an innovation, Aghion and
Tirole (1994) model the value stemming from the specialization of an innovation by a supplier/upstream firm to the products of a customer/downstream firm. In their set up, a firm's innovations can be tailored to that of its customers. Such specialization adds value that the specific to the customer/acquirer. Our use of the value paid by acquirers for young, private firms enables us to measure the specific value of innovative assets as well. Therefore, we predict that:
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the specific value of an innovative asset increases with the overlap of that asset with those of the agent/ firm to which the innovative asset is specialized to.
Data and Proxies
In this section, we describe our data and the proxies. As explained in the introduction, our premise in this paper is that examining the value paid for the private, innovative targets acquired have spanned approximately two decades, which include multiple booms and busts. Among other serial acquirers, Google has acquired firms only in the last few years, which precludes being able to control for booms or busts. While Microsoft has acquired more than 100 targets, most of the targets that Microsoft has acquired do not own any patents. As a result, valuing the innovative portfolio of these targets poses challenges. Intel's acquisitions pose a similar problem.
We combine data from several publicly available sources together with data that we hand-collected. Our acquisition data come from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database, which records all public bids. The data on patents and citations that we employ is hand collected from Google patents and USPTO. 6 The data on number of employees of the private companies is taken from the Capital IQ database as well as from the 8-K statements of Cisco. The stock return data for Cisco as well as the S&P 500 is drawn from CRSP.
Acquisition Data from SDC Platinum
We start with the data from SDC by searching for all the acquisitions made by Cisco, which gives us 257 separate records. Not all of these correspond to distinct acquisitions, nor can all of these be used for further analysis due to missing parameters. We cross-checked the effective dates of the acquisition that we obtained from SDC with the information provided on Cisco's website. For three deals, the SDC data doesn't provide the effective date of the acquisition. For these deals, we supplement this information with that obtained from the Cisco website, which we crosschecked using other internet sources. For these three deals, we edit the data manually. The three deals are the acquisitions of Precept Software (3/11/1998), Nemo "pending" in SDC are in fact listed as completed acquisitions in the Cisco website. In these cases, we change the status from "pending" as provided in SDC to "completed". We then apply some filters on this data to obtain the final data set that we analyze. These steps are detailed in Table 1 .
Patent Data from Google Patents and USPTO
Next, for each of the targets we obtain data on patents and citations from the Google patents database or the USPTO database. Previous studies have relied on the NBER patent database. Though Google's patent data has to be hand collected, it offers several advantages compared to NBER's patent data. Google provides the patent number and filing date for all patents. Using the advanced search option in Google patents, we search the number of patents for each of the targets. 7 We search for the target's name in the "original assignee" field. We obtain the number of patents for each target, the year each patent was filed, the patent class and the year it was granted. We obtain the details on the patents cited by the patents of the target company as well as the firms that cite 7 http://www.google.com/advanced_patent_search the target company's patents. We obtain this information for each patent annually, which we aggregate to the firm year level. We date the patents according to the year in which they were applied for to avoid anomalies that may be created due to the lag between the date of application and the date of granting of the patent (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001 ).
We hand collect the data for each of the target's patents from google patents. However, the number of patents of Cisco is very high, more than 8000. Also, we do not require detailed citations data for Cisco as we do for the targets. This is because we use the Cisco data to only calculate the overlap metric with the targets' patent portfolio. Due to these reasons, we collect the patent data for Cisco from the USPTO database by scripting. Patents have long been used as indicators of innovative activity in both micro-and macro-economic studies (Pakes and Griliches, 1980, and Griliches, 1990) . Although patents provide an imperfect measure of innovation, there is no other widely accepted method that can be applied to capture technological
advances. An alternative to patents, research and development (R&D) spending at the firm level could be a potential proxy for innovation. However, information about R&D spending is rarely available for private firms. Even if information about R&D spending were available or could be procured for private firms, using R&D as a proxy for innovation would present several challenges in our context. First, accounting norms would determine whether R&D is capitalized or expensed, which could in turn have a mechanical effect on R&D spending. Because such practices may vary across firms, especially private ones, these mechanical effects may influence the measures of R&D spending. It is also possible that private firms that would like to position themselves as attractive targets may manipulate overall R&D numbers and the proportion that is expensed/capitalized R&D. As a result, using R&D based measures to study the determinants of the value paid for the target would present several empirical challenges. Moreover, R&D spending represents the input to innovation while patents and citations capture the output of innovation. In any case, Griliches (1990) emphasized that there is a strong relationship in the U.S. between R&D and the number of patents received at the cross-sectional level across firms and industries. The median R-squared is of the order of 0.9.
Number of Employees
In many of the regression specifications, we include the number of employees the target has at the time of the acquisition. This serves two main purposes. First, since the number of employees serves as a useful proxy for firm size, we can control for the size of the company.
Second, we are able to estimate the value paid for the human capital embedded in the target's employees by using the number of patents and citations per employee. Of the 122 targets in our full sample, we are able to obtain data on the employees for 80 targets. We use the Capital IQ database as well as from news reports available on the internet. So, for those regressions where we include the number of employees, we have 80 observations.
Proxies 4.4.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable equals the total consideration paid for the target by the acquirer (excluding fees and expenses). The dollar value includes the amount paid for all common stock, common stock equivalents, preferred stock, debt, options, assets, warrants, and stake purchases made within six months of the announcement date of the transaction. If a portion of the consideration paid by the acquirer is common stock, the stock is valued using the closing price on the last full trading day prior to the announcement of the terms of the stock swap. Our sample includes cases where less than 100% of the target is acquired. In these cases, we scale the value of the transaction to 100% to account for the value that would have been paid if 100% stake had been acquired. We undertake this transformation because our patent data corresponds to the patent portfolio of the target firm as a whole. This scaling is performed as:
Value of transaction = Reported value of transaction *100/ Percentage of shares acquired
Explanatory variables
In our tests, we employ the following proxies for the intellectual property rights possessed by the target:
a) Number of target patents filed before the acquisition but granted after the acquisition:
This variable equals the sum total of patents filed by the target before the date of announcement of the acquisition, which were eventually granted. We exclude the patents filed before acquisition that were not eventually granted because the patent being granted indicates that the innovation is above a threshold level of quality b) Number of target patents granted before the acquisition: This variable equals the total number of patents granted to the target before the date of announcement of the acquisition.
c)
Indicator for at least one patent filed: This is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one patent has been filed by the target before the date of announcement of the acquisition and zero otherwise.
d)
Indicator for at least one patent granted: This is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one patent has been granted to the target before the date of announcement of the acquisition and zero otherwise.
To proxy the expertise possessed by the target, we employ several proxies based on the citations to the target's patents. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) demonstrate that patent citations are a good measure of the intrinsic value of an innovation. Intuitively, if another firm is willing to invest in a patentable project that is building upon a previous patent, the cited patent is economically important. Pakes and Shankerman (1984) show that the distribution of importance of patents is extremely skewed, i.e., most of the value is concentrated in a small number of patents. Therefore, citations capture the importance of a patent (Pakes and Griliches (1980)).
a) Number of citations received before the acquisition:
This variable equals the total number of citations received before the date of announcement of the acquisition to the patents filed by/ granted to the target.
b)
Number of self-citations before the acquisition: This variable equals the total number of self-citations, i.e. citations to target's own patents. Self-citations reflect follow-up innovation/ knowledge flowing from the knowledge underlying a firm's predecessor patents (Trajtenberg, Jaffe and Henderson (1992) ). Therefore, self citations capture the target's ability to exploit its existing innovations.
c) Total number of citations expected over patent lifetime:
This variable equals the total citations received till 2012 after adjusting for the truncation bias in citations. Since patents filed in recent years have had a less time to accumulate citations when compared to the older patents, raw citation counts will suffer from a truncation bias. We adjust for this truncation bias by using the citation-lag distribution estimated by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) . As detailed by them, the distribution tells us the fraction of lifetime citations that are received during any specified time interval in the life of the patent. The citations received till 2012 are corrected for truncation by dividing the same by the fraction of lifetime citations that are predicted to occur during the time interval between the filing year and the year of the acquisition. Formally, 
Control variables
We include Cisco's stock returns over different time periods to control for the fact that the value paid for a particular target maybe greater when Cisco's stock price is higher. In addition,
we included the logarithm of the S&P closing price on the effective date of the merger to account for the possibility that the premium paid for a particular target maybe greater when the market return is greater. Specifically, we include the following control variables: 
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 2 .
The sample corresponds to the 122 acquisitions made by Cisco over the time period 1993-2012.
First, we observe that the median value of the transaction equals $128.45 million while the mean transaction value equals $327.88 million, which suggests that Cisco has undertaken some very large acquisitions. This fact is also illustrated by the maximum transaction value of $5.658
billion. The employees of the target range from 8 to 2189, and the mean is 135.6. The variation in the number of employees of the target is similar to the variation in the value of the transaction.
The patents filed before acquisition but granted after acquisition varies from 0 to 26. Most of the targets have not filed even one patent before the acquisition, which is why the median value is 0.
The citations variables show a much wider range and standard deviation than the patents variables. The "Citations received before the acquisition" has the largest range (0 to 612) and the standard deviation. We have the split of the citations data depending on the source-self, Cisco or others. The variable 'citations from others' forms the largest chunk of the total number of citations received. We notice that maximum citations are received in the year of the acquisition and the number of citations received shows a decreasing trend till five years before the acquisition. A very similar trend is observed for Citations from Cisco in the years preceding the acquisition as well.
Results

Empirical specification
The extant literature (Griliches (1981 ), Hall et. al. (2000 ) estimates the value of intangible assets by assuming that the value of a firm with physical and knowledge assets is given by the additively separable linear specification: = ( + ), where , A it and K it represent the value, the stock of physical assets, and the stock of innovative assets of firm i at time t. For manufacturing firms, the ratio < 1 since physical assets account for a significant proportion of the assets of such firms. Therefore, the above specification is estimated as ln = + . However, in our case, implementing the above estimation procedure is problematic. We are interested in estimating the value of innovative assets by examining the value paid for young, private innovative firms. For such firms, innovative assets account for a significant proportion of the assets of the firm. Therefore, the ratio ≫ 1 in our case. Hence, we cannot use the approximation ln(1 + ) ≈ . Therefore, we formulate the estimation procedure in the following two ways. First, we employ an additively separable linear specification:
Since the year fixed effects (α t ) captures the average value paid for target acquired by Cisco in a particular year, β captures the value paid for the portfolio of innovative assets of a young, private innovative firm acquired by Cisco Systems. Alternatively, the value could be specified in multiplicative manner as:
The specification leads to the following regression equation:
where ≡ ln β t denotes year fixed effects. The coefficient τ represents the shadow price for the value of innovative assets. While we estimate both regression equations (1) and (3) to ensure that our results are robust to different functional form specifications, in the main body of the paper, we report the results using the regression equation (1). In the online Appendix, we show the main results obtained using regression equation (2). We prefer reporting the results using the regression equation (1) because the coefficients are easier to interpret. In the log-log specification in (2), τ provides us estimates of the elasticity of the value of the portfolio of innovative assets to measures of the portfolio of innovative assets. In contrast, the coefficient β captures directly the value paid for the innovative assets of the firm (K it ).
Value of Intellectual Property Rights
We start by testing hypothesis 1 using the following specification:
Value of transaction it = β 0 + β t + β 1 *IPR it + βX it + ε i
where Value of transaction it equals the value paid for 100% of target i acquired in year t, IPR it equals the intellectual property rights owned by target i in the year of the acquisition t. We use Cisco's return over 3 months, 6 months, one year before the acquisition and the logarithm of S&P 500 closing price as control variables in the above regression. We also add dummy variables corresponding to the year of acquisition to control for the effect of inter-temporal variations in the value paid. Note that given the year fixed effects, which captures the average value paid for a target in every year, the coefficient β 1 captures the incremental value paid corresponding for the knowledge assets of the target. Table 4 reports the result of the regression for the following proxies for the intuitive property rights possessed by the target: patents filed before acquisition but granted after acquisition, patents granted before acquisition, indicator for at least one patent filed, and indicator for at least one patent granted. In column 1, the independent variable is the number of patents filed before acquisition. We find that the effect of the number of patents filed before acquisition on the value of the transaction is statistically significant at a 5% significance level.
The results show that every additional patent filed before acquisition but granted after acquisition results in an increase in $88.392 million in the value of the transaction. A standard deviation increase in the number of patents filed before acquisition but granted after acquisition (i.e. an increase of 5.1 patents) leads to an increase in transaction value of $450.8 million which is 1.37 times the mean transaction value. Thus, we find that the effect of the number of patens filed on the value of the transaction is both statistically and economically significant.
In column 2, we run the regression with the number of patents granted as the independent variable, rather than the number of patents filed. We find the number of patents granted to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Every additional patent granted to the target before the acquisition increases the transaction value by $158.172 million. A standard deviation increase in the number of patents granted before acquisition (i.e. an increase of 3.2 patents) leads to an increase in transaction value of $506.2 million which is 1.54 times the mean transaction value.
In columns 3 & 4, we use the indicator variables for patents filed by and granted to the target before acquisition respectively. Both these variables are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. The coefficients indicate that on an average targets with at least one patent filed (granted) before acquisition are valued $567.4 ($718.33) million higher than targets with no patents filed (granted). Overall, the results in columns 1-4 confirm hypothesis 1 that targets with greater intellectual property rights are valued more.
Value of Expertise
Next, we examine hypothesis 2 using the following specification:
Value of transaction it = β 0 + β t + β 1 *Expertise i + βX it + ε i (5)
where Expertise it denotes a measure for the expertise underlying the innovative assets of target t.
Column 1 of Table 5 shows that the variable citations received before acquisition is statistically significant at 1% level. The coefficient obtained as a result of the regression is 5.795, but since the standard deviation of the citations received before acquisition is 83.1, every standard deviation increase in the number of citations leads to a $481.565 million increase in the value of the transaction, i.e. an increase which is 1.4 times the mean transaction value. This result confirms hypothesis 2.
Separating different dimensions of target's expertise
Having established that the value of the transaction depends on the expertise underlying the targets patents as proxied by citations received by the target's patents till the time of the acquisition, we now take a closer look at different dimensions of the expertise. Hall, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg (2005) find that market-value premia for firms in their sample are associated with future citations rather than the citations that have been received in the past. They also find that the market-value premia is impacted most by the portion of total lifetime citations that cannot be predicted based on the citation history at any given moment. In a similar vein, we look at the effect of future and past citations on the value of the transaction and whether the unpredictable citations matter more than the expected ones. Columns (3)-(5) of Table 5 show the results of these regressions. In column 3, the innovation proxy we use is the total number of citations over patent lifetime. This variable is the total citations received till 2012 adjusted for truncation bias by dividing it by the fraction of the lifetime citations that are predicted to occur during the time interval from the filing year till 2012. The coefficient we obtain for this variable is significant at the 1% statistical level. This complements our finding that the value of the transaction depends on citations received before the acquisition. We find that the value of the transaction depends on the total number of lifetime citations as well.
We next split the life time citations into those received before the acquisition and after the acquisition to see which of these has a greater effect on the value. When both these variables are added into the right-hand-side of our regression specification (Column 4), we find that the variable that truly matters is the citations received after the acquisition. At the time of the acquisition, the value paid by Cisco depends on the future citations that will be received rather than the past citations.
However, since the citations received till acquisition are possibly a very good indicator of future citations, this alone does not tell us that the past citations are irrelevant in determining the value. To examine this further, we split the future citations (those received after the acquisition) into a part that can be predicted given the past citation history and the residual unpredictable part. When we split the future citations this way and include the past citations in the regression specification as well (Column 5), we find that what really matters as a determinant of value is the portion of future citations which can be predicted by historical citations data given the past citations at the time of the acquisition.
Controlling for the Effect of Firm Size
As explained above, the number of employees provides a proxy for firm size. To examine if the above results are a manifestation of firm size, we include the number of employees in each target firm at the time of the acquisition. Since we have data on employees for only 80 of the targets, the number of observations in these regressions is only 80. The results of this set of regressions are reported in Table 6 . We observe that even after controlling for the size of the target, all our proxies for the intellectual property rights possessed by the target as well as the expertise of the target remain significant. Therefore, we can conclude that the above results are not entirely driven by the effects of firm size.
Value of overlap of target's innovative assets with those of the acquirer
Next, we examine hypothesis 3. The results are presented in Table 7 . The specification we employ in columns (1), (3) and (5)- (8) is:
Value of transaction i = β 0 + β t + β 1 *Overlap measure i + βX it + ε i (6)
The regression specification we employ in columns (2) and (4) is:
Value of transaction i = β 0 + β t + β 1 *Overlap measure i +β 2 *No. of employees + βX it + ε i (7)
In column 1, we employ the number of citations received by the target's patent portfolio from Cisco before the acquisition as a measure of the overlap. We find that the citations from Cisco are statistically significant at 1% level. Every citation from Cisco increases the transaction value by $42.66 million on an average and a standard deviation increase in the number of citations from Cisco results in an increase in transaction value of $554.55 million. Column 2 uses the same measure of overlap with employees added as a control variable. In this specification, every citation from Cisco before the acquisition increases the value by $ 51.045 million.In columns 3
and 4, we add the self-citations and citations from firms other than Cisco & self as innovation proxies in addition to the citations from Cisco. Among these three variables, the variable 'citations from Cisco' is the only one which is statistically significant once we control for the number of employees. The magnitude of the regression coefficient for this variable increases to $78.96 million when the other two independent variables are added.
In column 5, our overlap measure is computed by using the number of patents granted to
Cisco and the target in a specific patent class. We find that the increase in the value for a 100% overlap is $988.9 million. In other words, every 1% increase in the overlap of the patent portfolio with Cisco increases the value by $9.889 million. Column 6 uses the number of citations to patents granted to Cisco and the target in a patent class to compute the overlap measure. The economic magnitude of a 1% increase in this overlap measure is $9.645 million, very similar to that obtained in Column 5. These results provide evidence to support hypothesis 3.
We proceed to investigate whether the value increases when the technological overlap of the target with Cisco's competitors increase. Columns 7 and 8 report the results. A 1% increase in the overlap measure computed using patents increases the value by $6.95 million. A 1% increase in the overlap measure computed using citations increases the transaction value by $ 6.55 million.
Tests of External validity
As mentioned in the introduction, studies examining the value of innovation have to focus on young, private innovative firms that are the primary drivers of mold-breaking innovations. Since the value of such firms is not readily available, we employed the values estimated in the market for acquisition of such firms to arrive at estimates for the value of innovation. Furthermore, since uncertainty and the resulting concerns stemming from agency costs and asymmetric information are greater in private, innovative firms, we employed the sample of acquisitions of private, innovative firms by serial acquirer Cisco Systems to alleviate concerns that our estimates of the value of innovation are systematically biased. While this empirical strategy enabled us to reduce the various econometric concerns, a natural concern that arises is the following: can our results be generalized to other settings? To examine this concern, we check for external validity of the results by considering a sample of acquisitions undertaken by Google and Yahoo in a similar period to the one we have considered for Cisco, i.e. 1993 to 2013. As before, we only consider acquisitions where a majority stake was acquired. For this sample, we collect data on the total number of number of patents granted/filed before the acquisition as well as the total number of citations received. Therefore, for the prediction exercise, we employ one-by-one the following variables: (i) number of patents granted before acquisition, (ii) number of patents filed before acquisition, (iii) indicator for at least one patent granted before acquisition, (iv) indicator for at least one patent filed before acquisition, and (v) total number of citations over patent lifetime.
For each of these variables, we use the respective coefficients obtained in Tables 4 and 5 .
Using these coefficient estimates, we compute the difference between the actual value of these acquisitions and the value predicted using the coefficients from our regressions. To compute the error using a predictor variable, we use the following specification for acquisition i in year t Since the absolute value of the error varies with the size of the transaction as well as the variation in (Value it -Avg_Value t ), we normalize the Error it to calculate the error in percentage as:
We report the results in Table 8 after winsorizing the percentage error at the 5% level to remove the outliers. We observe that the median prediction error ranges from 6.8% to 8.7 % depending on the predictor variable used in the specification. The average value of the prediction error however is higher and ranges between 19% and 33%, which is expected given the effect of large values on the average. Since Yahoo and Google belong are Internet Search Engines while Cisco represents the telecommunications sector, we conclude that the coefficients obtained from the Cisco sample are reasonably valid externally, i.e. out-of-sample. Table 9 summarizes the estimates of the patent value from previous studies in the field.
Discussion
Comparison of the value of a patent with previous studies
The value we obtain for every patent filed is of the order of 80 million. This is considerably higher than in any of the previous studies above. The difference could be due to several reasons.
First, while these studies estimate the value of patents for manufacturing firms, we examine the value of patents for private innovative firms in the technology sector. Since patents are the lifeblood for such firms, the higher value we have estimated reflects this aspect. Second, the existing studies look at the value of patents for publicly listed firms. In contrast, we study the value of patents for private, innovative firms. Since young, private firms are the primary drivers for mold-breaking innovation, we would expect their patents to be valued more. Third, we study valuation of innovation portfolios by a serial acquirer as opposed to that by the stock market.
Cohen, Deither and Malloy (2013) find that the stock market ignores the implications of past successes when valuing future innovation. In contrast, it is unlikely that in the market for acquisition of innovative targets, the implications of past successes are ignored when valuing innovation. As a result, the expected future value implied by past successes is likely to be incorporated into our estimates of the value of patent. Finally, as mentioned above, intangible assets have value in generic use as well as in specific use. While the stock market estimates only the value of the patents in generic use, the value estimated using the price paid by the acquirer incorporates the value of the synergies that are specific to the acquirer.
Caveats and Limitations
Despite the tests for external validity conducted in Section 6, we provide a further discussion of possible caveats to keep in mind when applying our results to other sectors. (2000)), we believe the value of innovations estimated in other sectors should be greater than what we have estimated here. Levin et. al. (1982, p. 80) indicate that the electronics, semiconductors and telecommunications industries are markedly different from chemicals, surgical instruments, and drugs and biotechnology industries. In particular, while certain innovations can be patented in electronics, semiconductors, and telecommunications industries, the actual physical layout of an integrated circuit in a router, chip or any other electronic product is very difficult to patent. This difficulty arises from the difficulty associated with rendering a full verbal description of the layout of an integrated circuit of even moderate complexity. As a result of this characteristic, patent protection is substantially weak in the telecommunications, electronics and semiconductors industries, which has resulted in a wellestablished "reverse engineering" industry (Levin et al. (1982, p. 81) ).
In contrast, patent protection is strong in the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sectors.
Since a slight change in the underlying gene sequence of a protein can result in very different functions, it is very difficult, for example, to invent around a patent on a drug. It is also possible to patent particular molecules, building blocks for innovations (such as enzymes, proteins, hormones), and drug delivery systems. Furthermore, the ability to appropriate the gains from innovation remains closely linked to the ability to clearly articulate the know-how embodied in the underlying technologies. In the chemicals, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sectors, articulating such information is easy. Hence contracts specifying the limits to its use can be more easily designed. In contrast, in the telecommunications, semiconductors, and electronics sectors, information is highly context-dependent and cannot be crystallized to "abstract generalizations"
(Arora and Gambardella (1994)). Since the telecommunications industry does not offer strong protection against expropriation of innovations, we believe that the estimates of the value of innovation in this study possibly represent an underestimate.
Second, since patenting provides one of the many ways of appropriating the returns from innovation (Levin et. al. (1982) , Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) ), the estimates of the value of innovation in our study cannot be generalized to settings where the returns to innovation are appropriated through secrecy or through the use of complementary assets, which enable the firm to gain a first mover advantage in taking the product to the market.
With respect to the value paid by the acquirers of young, private innovative firms, we believe that our study provides accurate estimates of the intrinsic value of innovative assets. Our use of the differences in the value paid for targets acquired within same year by the same acquirer, especially one reputed for its fine-tuned M&A related processes, ensures that systematic biases in the value of innovative assets are minimal. If the value paid by a particular acquirer for a particular young, private innovative firm differs from the intrinsic value of innovative assets estimated here, this would only be due to one or more of the pernicious motivations for M&A. For example, an acquirer that is desperate to add to its innovative portfolio could pay more than the intrinsic value of that innovative portfolio estimated here.
However, the additional value in this case would be due to the acquirer desperation and not because of the lack of generality of the value of innovative assets estimated here. Similarly, the values paid during boom or busts may differ from the intrinsic value of innovative assets estimated here. However, this would be due to market timing reasons unrelated to the intrinsic value of innovative assets. Moreover, by cross-checking the estimates obtained using Cisco's acquisitions with those undertaken by Yahoo and Google, we alleviate concerns about external validity. Therefore, with respect to the value of innovative assets paid for by acquirers, our estimates are reasonably general.
Conclusion
Estimating the value of innovative assets assumes importance to academics, policymakers, investors and corporates. Since young, private firms are the primary drivers of mold-breaking innovation in an economy, studies estimating the value of innovative assets need to focus on the value ascribed to the innovative assets of such firms. A related, but equally important question is: How do acquirers in high-technology industries determine the price to pay for the knowledge assets of young, innovative firms? While focusing on young, private firms is relevant to understanding both these questions, such an approach poses significant challenges on two fronts. First, data to value private firms is not easily available. Second, valuing the innovative assets of a young, private firm entails significant uncertainty and the resultant problems stemming from agency costs and asymmetric information. In this paper, we adopt a novel approach to circumventing the data-related problems for the value of young, private firms by using the value paid for such firms in the active market for acquisition of these firms. We combine this approach with unique hand-collected data for the patents and citations of these firms from Google patents database. We obtain precise estimates of the value paid for these innovative assets by comparing deals within the same year by the same acquirer-Cisco Systems. We find that acquirers pay for the target's intellectual property rights, its expertise/technology especially that overlapping with the acquirer's expertise/technology and the We are only interested in transactions which have been completed, not those whose statuses are "rumored "or "pending" or "unknown". (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) ( 1 (2)and (4) and fixed effects for the actual year of acquisition are included in all specifications. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The regression equation estimated is:
Value of transaction i = β 0 + β t + β 1 *Overlap Proxy i + βX it + ε i in columns (1), (3) and (5) We check for external validity of the results by considering a sample of acquisitions undertaken by Google and Yahoo in a similar period to the one we have considered for Cisco, i.e. 1993 to 2013 and predicting the value using predictor variables from the Cisco regressions. We only consider acquisitions where a majority stake was acquired. We compute the error as the difference between the actual value of these acquisitions and the value calculated using the coefficients of the predictor variables from the Cisco regressions. The table sumamrises the normalized percentage error forn these tests.
To compute the error using predictor variable n, we use the following specification for acquisition i in year t Value it -Value t = (Coefficient of predictor n * predictor n it ) + ε it where Value t is the average value of 100% equity across all acquisition transactions undertaken in that year. 
